The Galwan clash of India and China: Duplicity, brutality, and vengeance

A June 15 clash in the Galwan Valley of northern India resulted in the deaths of 20 or more Indian and 35 or more Chinese soldiers, according to reporting and sources. Both countries appear to be downplaying the violence and withholding information in face-saving attempts at de-escalation even as the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed the entire valley as its territory and satellite photos from June 22 show a new Chinese encampment in Indian territory at the spot of China’s attack.

To deter the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in future, international economic sanctions should be imposed, and India should seek closer defense cooperation with countries like the United States, Japan, Australia, Britain, France, and Germany, as well as with international organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The political fallout from the border clash, the bloodiest between China and India since 1967, is a mix of solemn commitments to defend territorial sovereignty and misinformation by China and to a lesser extent in the highly partisan politics of India.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) claims a strong defense of the nation from China while trying to downplay the incursion. On June 20, the prime minister went so far as to claim that China did not enter India’s territory. But satellite photos of Chinese soldiers on India’s side of the de facto border is problematizing that message. Despite analysts seeing Modi as stronger on defense, Rahul Gandhi of the competing Indian National Congress (INC) has used the Indian army’s retreat to tar Modi as soft on China.

China too is quietly disputing the BJP’s account. Independent military analyst Song Zhongping, according to The New York Times, said India’s claims of the Chinese death toll were too high but the correct figure would not be released “to avoid stimulating intense sentiment in India.”

Strategic context

Galwan Valley is on the border of China-occupied Aksai Chin and India-occupied Ladakh. Over 100 km southeast of Galwan are other disputed parts of the de facto border, including a large saltwater lake called Pangong Tso and Demchok village. “The security forces posted in the region always show restraint, but people of Ladakh always confront the Chinese whenever there is an intrusion attempt,” according to a former Ladakh official. “In areas like Demchok and Chushul, a lot of grazing land has been intruded upon by the Chinese.”

Ladakh is the part of India-administered Kashmir that borders Aksai Chin. Kashmir is getting pressured by not only China from the northeast, but Pakistan from the northwest. To the immediate north of Ladakh is the Siachen Glacier, occupied in 1984 by the Indian Army, and held against Pakistan at the cost of $1 million per day. To the northwest of Siachen is the Shaksgam tract, ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963.

Competing stories of the clash

The official story from New Delhi is that 20 Indians died in the clash on June 15. Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed that the Chinese troops never strayed into Indian territory. This appears incorrect in light of satellite photos from May 22 to June 22, if not the history of Aksai Chin, which was fully occupied by China in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

A satellite photo from May 22 shows 15-20 Chinese soldiers around a large tent set up on the bank of the Galwan River near Patrol Point 14, about 137 meters inside Indian territory from the LAC. Another photo on June 16, one day after the attack, shows what may be debris. By June 22, tents and walls have been erected on the Chinese-occupied bank of the river, across from which is a single wall on the Indian-occupied bank. That Chinese encampment disrupts the ability of the Indian military to reach Patrol Point 14 (PP14), which Indian soldiers previously reconnoitered on a regular basis. 

Modi’s statement surprised Indian analysts who point to all of Aksai Chin’s 38,000 square kilometers as occupied. China also attempted to occupy India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh in 1962, but withdrew in 1963. 

China continued to press on India’s border during the latter’s 1965 war with Pakistan. Starting in 1962 and 1966 respectively, Pakistan and China supported Naga secessionists in India’s northeast. In 1967 China attempted to stop India from building a fence at Nathu La near Doklam, but was turned away through fighting in which India lost 200 men and China lost 300. Chinese pressure on India subsided as the PLA shifted its attention to its Manchurian border, where Russian troops were building up in preparation for the 1969 war. 

Some Indian analysts believe that PLA leaders in the Western Theater Command (WTC), including Gen. Zhao Zongqi and Lt. Gen. Xu Qiling, engineered the conflict to promote themselves within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They believe the same incentives drove the Doklam conflict in 2017. This story is supported by a U.S. intelligence assessment but should not absolve Secretary General Xi Jinping, whose responsibility it is to reign in his subalterns. According to the assessment and perhaps purposefully redolent of the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 in which he took part, Gen. Zhao in the recent clashes reportedly sought to “teach India a lesson.”

China and India were allegedly in the process of de-escalation and pullback when China on June 15 unilaterally set up one or two tents near PP14, at a bend in the Galwan River. The land is claimed by India, whose soldiers set the tent on fire, according to multiple media accounts and a source, and in response the Chinese brutally attacked.

After a tent was “removed”, another story relates that, armed lightly with clubs, the Indians could not effectively fight back. Several were killed on the spot by the better-armed Chinese soldiers. Other Indians fled back to a base camp 9 km distant to alert the others. Some say that the Chinese soldiers were unfamiliar to the Indian soldiers, who had developed good relations with the prior group of Chinese.

A need for stronger alliances and transparency

The competing stories spawned by a lack of reporter access to soldiers who were involved in the Galwan clash indicate attempts at information operations by both China and India, as well as by the INC.  

But regardless of which story one believes, China’s role in creating the border conflict with India, from refusing to demarcate the border as far back as the 19th century, to initiating the 1962 war, and undeniable continued pushing of boundaries through incrementalism and grey zone tactics today, should be condemned by the international community. The response should include economic sanctions and the holding of China’s leadership personally responsible.  Xi Jinping, Zhao Zongqi, and Xu Qiling should all be subject to Magnitsky and other international sanctions for their roles in dangerously increasing tensions between the two nuclear powers.

India’s historic and continued self-reliance with respect to China and Pakistan, and its attempt to match Chinese forces at incursion points, is admirable. Joint patrols with Japan and France, and a shared bases agreement with Australia, all in 2020, are positive. But they are not enough to stop China.

China and Pakistan are allied, and despite India’s self-soothing reporting on its stronger mountain forces, China has nuclear, air and naval superiority. India’s lack of treaty defense allies plays into China’s strategies of incrementalism and divide-and-conquer and explains, along with Chinese influence in the country, why India is desperate to limit escalation even at the cost of regular losses of territory. India’s military and alliance weaknesses all but invite a disastrous two-front war launched by China and Pakistan.

A better strategy for India and democracies globally would be to join forces with allies that seek to balance against the alliance between, and limit the influence of, China, Pakistan, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Joining forces against these aggressive countries will not in any way compromise the autonomy of India, but will rather ensure its defense.

Anders Corr holds a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University and has worked for U.S. military intelligence as a civilian, including on China and Central Asia. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official editorial position of LiCAS.news

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This article was published July 3, 2020.